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Abstract
This article is an attempt to present a simplified account 
of the theory of truth expressed in the writings of certain 
existentialist writers -  namely, Kierkegaard, Heidegger, 
Jaspers, and Marcel. It is designed to serve as a supple­
ment to conventional textbook treatments of the nature 
of truth, which typically ignore the contributions that 
existentialists have made to the topic. An existential 
theory of truth stresses the epistemological (not ontolo­
gical) indeterminateness of meaning and truth, apart 
from one’s personal participation in determining them.
Contrary to superficial interpretations, this theory 
does not do away either with a transcendent reality or 
with objectivity. What is rejected is anything that would 
circumvent the necessary task of participating, oneself, 
in the epistemological determination of truth.
1. PREFACE
I find it remarkable that mainstream introductory textbooks in philosophy that at­
tempt to be comprehensive -  including those which attempt to cover continental as 
well as Anglo-American philosophy -  continue to ignore the distinctive contribu­
tions that existentialists have made to the discussion of the nature of truth. I have in 
mind particularly the contributions of Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Jaspers, and Mar­
cel.i Nietzsche’s discussion of truth, if he can be regarded as an existentiahst, has 
increasingly been brought into discussion. Occasionally, though often in the most 
contextless and distorting way, Kierkegaard’s alleged claim that ‘truth is subjectivity’ 
is btought into discussion under philosophy of religion. But never are any of the key
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ideas of the existentialists regarding truth brought squarely into the discussion of 
epistemological issues. Even less do you hear of their ideas in textbook surveys of 
epistemology.2
This disturbs me. It disturbs me for three reasons:
• students with an interest in epistemological issues are in effect denied access to 
significant discussions of these issues;
• significant and insightful ideas about epistemological issues are in effect debar­
red from the philosophical arena of discussion; and
• the principal philosophical positions given contemporary credence are not for­
ced to answer to all of the significant arguments to the contrary.
It is not the case that existentialist discussions of the nature of truth have been care­
fully examined by mainstream Anglo-American philosophers, refuted, and rightfully 
dismissed from further serious discussion. Rather, it has been the case that no care­
ful examination has been undertaken in the first place -  due to cultural prejudice, 
philosophical presumption, and/or lack of patience in empathizing with presupposi­
tions different from one’s own.
What I am attempting to do here is to articulate in rather simple terms what I 
have come to understand to be the existentialist theory of truth. Strictly speaking, it 
is only an existentialist theory of truth, one among others. I do not wish to under­
take a discussion of nuanced differences between existentialists in their discussions 
of truth. What I present is an idealized reconstruction that I hold to be generally 
representative of several of the existentialists. My intention is to sketch out clearly 
the general kind of alternative conception of truth developed by the existentialists. 
An ulterior intention of this paper is to compose a straightforward account of the 
existentialist theory of truth which could serve undergraduate students as a supple­
ment to text readings on conventional theories of truth. I especially solicit construc­
tive critical response that might help this intention be more fully realized.
A final prefatory comment that does begin to draw distinctions between some 
existentialists: most philosophers superficially acquainted with existentialism appear 
to have taken Jean-Paul Sartre’s popular account of existentialism -  variously titled 
in English ‘Existentialism,’ ‘Existentialism and Humanism’, and ‘What is Existentia­
lism?’ -  as definitive of the movement, and Sartre’s own views elaborated in Being 
and nothingness and elsewhere as basically representative of the other members of 
the movement. That is to be misled, for Sartre’s views are in several repects not 
representative. Sartre never did take up a discussion of the nature of truth at any 
length in the works published in his lifetime, and what is implied about the nature of 
truth in his writing is not representative of other existentialists. Recently, a posthu­
mously published manuscript entitled Truth and Existence has made clear that he did
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develop a theory of truth, but its unrepresentative status regarding the views of 
other existentialists remains true. The point I wish to make is that the existential 
theory of truth I here articulate does not presume to represent Sartre’s views -  or 
those of anyone else who happens to agree with Sartre in the relevant respects. On 
the contrary, it is an attempt to represent the views of certain existentialists other 
than Sartre, views which avoid the contradiction in which I believe Sartre’s views are 
caught .3
D Cannon
2. THE EXISTENTIAUST APPROACH TO THE QUESTION OF TRUTH
Where does an existentialist reflection on truth begin? It begins with a shift of 
attention and emphasis from what is customary in conventional approaches, whether 
realist, ideahst, or pragmatist: from a focus on what to a focus on how, from concen­
trating on objective content to concentrating on the mode and manner in which we are 
related to that content and on the ways in which the mode and manner of ow relation­
ship is reflected in how that content is conceived. Existentialists are keen to point out 
that how we think of something, how we conceive of it and represent it, always re­
flects a certain way of taking up a relationship to the thing. For example, how we 
think of a thing may express a relationship of indifference, of taking it for granted, 
of solicitude, of care to be as faithful as possible, of endeavour to let it be seen and 
understood on its own terms, et cetera. This is lost sight of when we mistake our 
representation of the thing for the thing itself or suppose we have nothing to do with 
anything except representations.
Take note of the form of articulation customarily used by conventional approa­
ches: almost invariably they write in the grammatical third person, an extemalizmg, 
objectifying mode. And what they write about is written about as if it made perfect 
sense, regardless of how anyone may be related to it and as if it were (or could be) 
unproblematically ascertained to be true in general, by and for nobody in particular.
Reflect for a moment on the process of making sense of things and finding 
things out for yourself concretely in the first person. For something finally to make 
sense, it must at least make sense to you (ie you must make sense of it) and for 
something to be recognized to be true, it must finally be recognized to be true by 
you. No one else’s efforts to determine truth or meaning can suffice for you -  apart 
from your own accreditation in the present of that person’a efforts, otherwise all you 
have is the other person’s allegation that something is so. You yourself must get in 
the act and risk your own powers in determining the meaning and truth of the mat­
ter in question.
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But most conventional modern approaches to truth (certain American philoso­
phers like James and Dewey excepted) curiously leave this first-person, existential 
dimension out of account. Attention in such approaches is directed outward in the 
third person, outward upon a perfectly definite object or state of affairs on which 
(for realists at least) human claims presume to bear, and outward as well upon the 
perfectly determinate claims or propositions whose truth is under consideration. 
There is no uncertainty as to what these things mean. Nor is there any serious ques­
tion that a given statement meets or fails to meet the supposedly perfealy definite 
criteria that are supposed to determine its truth. That these matters are (or can be 
made) entirely clear is taken for granted. Inquiry, in consequence, is imagined to be 
a more or less linear activity, everywhere having the possibility (in principle) of a 
clear and visualizable prospect -  with none of the uncertainty, unclarity, and dialec­
tical round-aboutness that plagues ordinary folk who must go about things concre­
tely. Indeed, the conventional, modem, philosophical picture of the situation leaves 
no room for personal determination of meaning and truth at all. It conceives the 
knowing mind in Cartesian fashion as set off from a determinate external world it 
can at best relate to only in a detached manner, fashioning clear and distinct (ie, 
wholly determinate in meaning), third-person, hypHJthetical representations of the 
world to be submitted to imp>ersonal testing as to their determinate truth status.
Conventional approaches assume that raising the question of truth in this 
‘objective’ fashion (i e in the third person and in a manner such that all things are 
assumed to be perfectly determinate) leaves nothing essential out of acount that 
might be identified by raising it in any other way. Specifically, they assume that to 
raise the question of truth in the first person -  that is, for me to raise it for myself, or 
for you to raise it for yourself -  involves nothing essentially different from raising it 
in the third person.
Yet for us in the first person singular -  to begin with, anyway -  nothing given is 
ever perfectly definite or ever perfectly certain. For something epistemologically to 
become definite (as distinct from ontologically definite), you and I must get into the 
act and interpret it in some measure and render it determinate. It only becomes 
epistemologically determinate (if only determinately indeterminate) as you and I 
render it so, deciphering its meaning. This is the case even when it is a meaning 
which will turn out to be ‘entirely determined’ in terms of certain rules.
This epislemological indeterminateness of meaning and truth, apart from our 
first personal participation that is lost sight of and covered over by conventional 
approaches, is the principal issue over which the existentialists part company with 
them. To proceed as if it can be ignored is to presume to step outside human finite­
ness; it is to presume to occupy a divine jjerspective. For existentialists are concer­
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ned to have us raise the question of truth in the first person singular (me for myself 
and you for yourself). Indeed, they contend that there is no other authentic way to 
raise it and that to presume to treat the question of truth in the third person in the 
conventional manner is already, though inauthentically, to have resolved for oneself 
the most important issue by default -  as if one could escape the finitude of an indivi­
dual human perspective and the unavoidable existential tasks of deciphering for 
oneself what is meant and ascertaining for oneself what is true. To treat the ques­
tion of truth in the conventional way is to lend one’s personal capacity for determi­
ning meaning and ascertaining truth to the support of abstract ‘objective’ represen­
tations (in propositional form) of the way things are, second-hand representations 
that belong to no one in particular and are supposed to suffice for everyone in gene­
ral. Indirectly, it is to lend personal, existential support to the idea that there is no 
point or need to devote personal attention to the determination of meaning and 
truth, no need to establish access to the matters in question for oneself.
DCannon
3. DEFlNmONS OF TRUTH
So far as they have any truth to them at all, behind and beneath all such ‘objective’ 
representations that appear to assert themselves is the participation of someone 
(and ultimately you and me) who accredits them, someone who asserts them, if you 
will. The ‘objective form’ of the represention leads one to lose sight of and forget 
this essential, first-person participation. The ‘objective form’ gives the impression 
that the asserter, validator, and critic of the representation are absent from the 
scene and that they can innocently be ignored. In a certain sense, of course, it is oi 
if they are absent and can functionally be ignored. As a result, truth gets defined, 
for the realist, as a relationship of objective correspondence between the represen­
tation and the state of affairs it purportedly represents -  for the idealist, as a rela­
tionship of objective coherence between the the representation and the systematic 
totality of serious representations not at the moment in question, and for the prag­
matist as a relationship of objective coherence among actions guided by and expe­
riences interpreted by the representation. In each case, truth becomes a function of 
a third-person relationship between the ‘objective’ representation and something 
else, an impersonal relationship which is supposed to hold regardless of the dispo­
sition of the persons involved, regardless of whether anyone is bothering to establish 
that the relationship actually holds.
Now, because an ‘objective relationship’ in this sense is already determinately 
what it is, already an accomplished fact, not needing anyone to determine and ack­
nowledge it to be the case, the notion of truth as an ‘objective relationship’ of one
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sort or another is of no relevance whatsoever to someone who is in the process of at­
tempting to make sense of and ascertain truth at first-hand. When little or nothing 
in the circumstance is clear and determinate, a criterion of truth that can only be 
applied to clear and determinate factors is worse than useless. On the contrary, the 
issue for someone in that circumstance is one of passionate care: how to move to a 
state of clarity from one that is unclear; how to uncover what is covered over; how to 
move to discovery when all you have are vague clues and hints; how to move from a 
situation of ignorance into a relationship of first-hand acquaintance with -  and 
understanding of -  the reality or state of affairs as it really is. From the perspective 
of the finite human being who is concretely attempting to determine meaning and 
ascertain truth for himself, truth would be such a self-determined relationship of 
deepening rapport with reality as it really is. Indeed, say the existentialists, that is the 
root meaning of truth, and the conventional philosophical notions -  involving rela­
tions between propositional representations and what they are supposed to repre­
sent -  are entirely derivative from and dependent upon it.
Note some curious implications of this conception of truth. Truth is a self-deter­
mined relationship of deepening first-person acquaintance with reality in its transcen­
dent otherness from oneself of increasing first-person correspondence. Being so, it can­
not ultimately be stated or put into words. All that is represented or put into words 
at best testifies of, or points to, or reflects, that relationship but cannot itself be that 
relationship. Hence all explicit knowledge by representation is rooted and groun­
ded in a tacit knowledge by acquaintance. To receive and accredit information from 
another person about a certain situation (eg to be told the truth you wish to learn) is 
ultimately to appeal to another person’s acquaintance with the situation in question; 
the buck has to stop somewhere. The existentialist notion of truth hinges, therefore, 
upon the possibility of direct personal acquaintance with things, upon a fundamental 
‘disclosedness’ of things to us (to use Heidegger’s phrasing) -  indeed, upon the 
possibility of direct mutual acquaintance and recognition by multiple persons.
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4. INESCAPABLE RESPONSIBILITY IN THE DETERMINATION OF 
TRUTH
The existentialists would awaken us to our complicity in shaping and acknowledging 
the world to be what we take it ‘naturally* and ‘objectively’ to be quite apart from us. 
No matter how ‘objectively given’ a truth may seem to be (as reflected, say, in its 
formal mode of expression), it has to come back someplace to someone’s deter­
mination and acknowledgement of it, to be ‘objectively given.’ And because of that 
peculiar ‘fact’ it is not (or is never wholly) objectively given. The objective voice dis­
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guises our existential participation in tlie determination of truth. All truth deter­
mined to be truth by somebody (and ultimately by you and me). All truth is acknow­
ledged truth. (Even truth acknowledged by others, to be truth, must be acknowled­
ged by us as well.) We bear responsibility for acknowledging all truth; it implicates 
us. Indeed, there is a sense in which we have no relation to truth apart from our 
determination and acknowledgement of it. (Heidegger would put it even more radi­
cally; it is not that the determination of truth rests with us -  implying that we could, 
if we chose, opt not to participate in it -  but that it is so fundamental to our being 
that we cannot escape participating in the determination of truth. The possibility of 
avoiding, covering over, or distorting the truth presupposes in some sense our prior 
acquaintance with it: untruth presupposes truth.)
D Cannon
5. THE PROBLEM OF SUBJECTIVISM AND ITS SOLUTION
But then does that not make truth simply a function of our self-determination and 
personal acknowledgment? Does that not make truth merely our own creation? 
Indeed, does that not make truth simply subjective? No, it does not, though most 
superficial interpretations of the existentialists make them out to be saying just that. 
(Many readers of Kierkegaard’s Concluding unscientific postscript neglect to take 
into account a passage which follows a few pages after the infamous claim that truth 
is subjectivity which goes on to explain how subjectivity is untruth! The pwint is that, 
de jure, subjectivity is to become truth, but. de facto, subjectivity is untruth.) How­
ever, the possibility that what at any given moment we take to be truth is merely 
subjective and not truth is very real, and the attainment of truth can never be taken 
for granted. More precisely, the likelihood is that very much of what we take to be 
truth is not truth but subjectivity in one respect or another, coloured by individual 
predeliction and shaped by cultural frames of reference. (Heidegger claims that all 
our participation in truth is simultaneously and ineradicably a participation in un­
truth as well.) The crucial factor is the human capacity for transcendence -  for stret­
ching (or being stretched) beyond one’s own subjectivity, to become aware of and be 
in rapport with realities that transcend the self -  and a passionate care for its achieve­
ment.
Strictly speaking, this transcendence is a positive transcendence -  something 
more than and decidely different from the negative transcendence of the subject that 
is so strongly stressed by Sartre. The point is that for us to be in rapport with reali­
ties that transcend ourselves, we must not only have our own personal awareness of 
things -  brought out so clearly by Sartre -  but that awareness must be of things as 
they truly are and not just as we happen, or as someone else happens, for the
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moment, to be seeing them. We must be capable in some measure of ascertaining 
the propriety and justness of our awareness of things, and thus of glimpsing the gap 
between our notion of them and what they are in truth, that is glimpsing what they 
are in their transcendence beyond our mental representation of them -  but not so tran­
scendent that rapport, that entry into their presence, becomes impossible.
Were we incapable of this transcendence, this becoming present to things in 
themselves, truth would indeed simply be a matter of self-determined subjectivity. 
And in so far as we sceptically doubt this capacity in ourselves and others, that is the 
conclusion we come to; attainment of truth becomes impossible and, in the judge­
ment of some, airy nonsense -  or a disguise for exerting our arbitrary will to power 
over others. Sceptical doubt of truth itself disables the achievement of truth. Note 
here the curiously indispensible cogrútive role of faith in a certain sense: if we did not 
believe ascertaining the truth were pwssible, we would make no effort to ascertain it. 
More: if we did not have intimations of hidden truth and faith in them, and faith in 
our capacity to follow them up responsibly, we could make no progress in finding it. 
It follows that affirmation of this capacity of transcendence in ourselves and others 
is itself an expression of faith -  of faith in faith in this generic, cognitive sense. It 
cannot authentically be voiced in an impersonal, ‘objective’ mode. It is necessarily 
self-accredited.
It is only by virtue of our self-accredited ability to recognize transcendence in a 
person or in a particular person’s judgement when we see it that we lay claim to 
truth. More specifically, it is only by virtue of our own self-accredited transcen­
dence, our self-accredited achievement of having come to know something for our­
selves, that we recognize transcendence in another as well as other realities beyond 
ourselves.
Thus, contrary to what is often thought, the existentialists (at least the ones I 
seek to represent) do not do away with transcendent reality. They are not non-rea­
lists: Nor do they reject the notion of objectivity. (What they reject is the formal 
mode of objectivity as an equivalent to the authentic achievement of objectivity -  in 
the sense of ascertaining the nature of the object itself -  and as an attempt to cir­
cumvent the necessary task of participating, oneself, in the determination of mea­
ning and truth.) Rather, they contend that realism and authentic objectivity make 
no sense apart from the inner work of passionate self-transcendence, of bringing 
oneself progressively into conformity with reality. Truth is a personal achievement, 
demanding an ascetic overcoming of what inwardly stands in the way of its recogni­
tion and acknowledgement.'*
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Endnotes
1. Kierkegaard’s views on the nature of truth are most fully developed in Soren 
Kierkegaard (1941), especially Book Two, Parts One and Two. Two excellent 
secondary discussions are C Stephan Evans (1983:115-135) chapter seven Truth 
and subjectivity’, and Louis Mackey (1969:31-57).
Heidegger (1977:117-141) explicitly discusses truth in his essay, ‘On the 
essence of truth’, and in his book. The basic problems o f phenomenology (Hei­
degger 1982:213-224) in section 18: ‘Assertorial truth: The idea of truth in gene­
ral, and its relation to the concept of being’.
Jaspers’ (1986:230-235) treatment of truth may be found in Basic philoso­
phical writings. Part Four: ‘What is truth?’.
Marcel’s (1960) most explicit discussions of truth are found in The mystery 
of being (1960:58-70) and ‘Truth and freedom’ and ‘Truth and concrete situa­
tions’, both in Tragic wisdom and beyond (1973:80-90, 91-102 respectively).
It should go without saying that attempts to understand these discussions of 
truth should take into account the larger philosophical context established by 
these particular writers’ works.
2. One of the finest brief surveys extant of epistemological theories, including 
theories of truth (though not including existential theories of truth), is that of 
Paul K Moser and Arnold Vander Nat (1987:3-22), Human knowledge: Classical 
and contemporary approaches.
3. What is implied by his stated views (at least those of ‘the early Sartre’) is a cu­
rious contradictory mixture of realism and subjective idealism: Realism with re­
gard to fundamental ontology and a radically subjective idealism with regard to 
meaning. On the one hand, his fundamental ontology - bifurcating being-for- 
itself or human subjective understanding from being-in-itself or objective reality 
(which lies ineffably beyond all humanly meaningful characteriza-tion) -  ap­
pears to presuppose the traditional conception of truth as correspondence (cor­
respondence between Sartre’s ontological propositions and the fundamental 
structure of being). On the other hand, his analysis of ordinary human affirma­
tions (which his fundamental ontology is supposed somehow to transcend) pre­
supposes truth as subjective coherence or authenticity (meaning: subjective self- 
consistency plus a kind of negative or inverted correspondence with being-itself, 
a kind of perpetual noncoincidence or, as he puts it, a nihilation). In conse­
quence, to be authentic, a statement (again, Sartre’s ontological statements are 
apparently excepted) can make no appeal to an objective order of being as the 
ground of its meaning but must instead selfconsciously reflect its basis in the 
ultimately arbitrary, perpetually unstable projection of its author’s subjectivity -
D Cannon
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which is to say: to be authentic, it must somehow reflect its ultimate groundless­
ness. Thus, it can be affirmed authentically only in the mode of never (quite) 
being affirmed; it can never be affirmed univocally. With the exception of some 
of the literary existentialists, {)erhaps, no other existentialist holds to these con­
tradictory views of Sartre.
4. In this respect they link up with several pre-modem traditions of thought - parti­
cularly broadly Platonist criticisms of Aristotelian thought, such as those articu­
lated by medieval monastic critics of the largely Aristotelian scholasticism which 
came to dominate the medieval universities. See Jean Leclerq (1974), The love 
of learning and the desire for God, especially chapter IX; and Steven Ozment 
(1980:73-82), The age of Reform: 1250-1550.
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